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* Bank of Italy, Economic and Financial Statistics Department.   1 Introduction1
In recent decades the strong growth of trade in intermediate inputs and
the increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) have been major features of
international trade. A useful conceptual framework to address these issues is
the assumption that a ﬁrm which needs an intermediate input has to make
a two-dimensional choice: it has to decide where to produce the good (at
home or abroad) and how to produce it (in-house or outsourced to another
ﬁrm). Combining these two choices yields four possibilities: an input can
be produced in the home country, either in-house (domestic integration) or
not (domestic outsourcing), or it can be produced in a foreign country, again
either in-house (foreign integration or FDI) or not (foreign outsourcing). As
argued by Helpman (2006a), “an understanding of what drives these choices
is essential for an understanding of the recent trends in the world economy”.
Several theoretical models, at the crossroads of industrial organization
and international trade, have been developed (Antr` as 2003, 2005, Antr` as and
Helpman 2004, Grossman and Helpman 2004, Antr` as and Helpman 2008).
Despite a rich set of predictions, the empirical literature is far from abundant
and provides only partial and incomplete pictures of sourcing strategies.
Using trade data, some studies look at intra-ﬁrm imports as a proxy of
1I am grateful to Alfonso Rosolia, Luigi Federico Signorini, Marcel Smolka, Lucia
Tajoli, Roberto Tedeschi, Davide Vannoni, two anonymous referees and participants in
the 10th ETSG Conference in Warsaw, the 2nd FIW Research Conference “International
Economics” in Vienna, the Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano Conference on “Innovation,
Internationalization and Global Labor Markets” in Turin and the INFER Workshop on
“Firm and Product Heterogeneity in International Trade” in Brussels for their useful
comments. I am also grateful to Alessandra De Michele for editorial assistance. The views
expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reﬂect those of the
Bank of Italy. E-mail: stefano.federico@bancaditalia.it.
5the preference for FDI over foreign outsourcing (Antr` as 2003, Yeaple 2006,
Nunn and Treﬂer 2008, Bernard et al. 2008), but this literature does not
take into account domestic production (either by integration or outsourcing).
Very few studies use ﬁrm-level data (Tomiura 2007, Defever and Toubal
2007), but they suﬀer from the same limitation, that is they do not provide
any information on inputs purchased from domestic suppliers. Two related
strands of literature look at the eﬀects of imported intermediate inputs on
productivity (Amiti and Konings 2007, Kasahara and Rodrigue 2008, G¨ org
et al. 2008) or at importers’ productivity premia (Bernard et al. 2007,
Castellani et al. 2008, Muuls and Pisu 2009), respectively. These studies,
however, only consider the location of production, and not the organization
of production: no distinction is made between intra-ﬁrm and arm’s-length
imports.
This paper contributes to the literature by simultaneously taking into
account both the location and the organization of production of intermediate
inputs. Using detailed information on the sourcing strategies adopted
by a sample of Italian manufacturing ﬁrms, we are able to observe the
four organizational forms mentioned above (domestic integration, domestic
outsourcing, foreign integration and foreign outsourcing). The structure of
our data closely matches the Antr` as and Helpman (2004) model, allowing
for a rigorous test of its predictions. Furthermore, our data on intermediate
inputs only include inputs produced within a “subcontracting” relationship,
i.e. according to the speciﬁcations of the buying company. Therefore, in
contrast to the large majority of previous studies, our data exclude raw
materials and standardized or “generic” inputs bought on a spot market.
6This is fully consistent with theory, which usually assumes that the supplier
is required to undertake relationship-speciﬁc investments in order to produce
the goods needed by the ﬁrm.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper which reports ﬁrm-level evidence
for the four organizational forms at the same time. This goes exactly in
the direction suggested, among others, by Bernard et al. (2007, p. 128):
“Further progress [...] will require explicit consideration of the boundaries
of the ﬁrm, including the decisions about whether to insource or outsource
stages of production, and whether such insourcing or outsourcing takes place
within or across national boundaries” (see also Greenaway and Kneller 2007,
Helpman 2006b).
A further contribution of this paper is that it provides much-needed
evidence on Italian ﬁrms’ sourcing strategies abroad. Unlike those of other
countries, Italy’s trade statistics do not collect information on whether goods
are imported from an aﬃliate company or from an independent supplier. This
has made it impossible until now to evaluate the relative importance of FDI
versus foreign outsourcing for Italian ﬁrms, and this paper aims to ﬁll this
gap.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews related
literature and Section 3 describes the data. Sections 4 and 5 report empirical
results on productivity ordering and headquarter intensity, respectively.
Section 6 concludes.
72 Related literature
Theories on the choice between integration and outsourcing are mainly
based on the property rights approach. Production of a ﬁnal good requires
two intermediate inputs, which are assumed to be speciﬁc for a particular
production and cannot be used outside that production. One of the two
inputs can only be provided by the ﬁnal-good producer at home; for the
other input, the producer decides where to locate its production (at home
or abroad) and whether to make it in-house or buy it from an independent
supplier. The supplier has to undertake a relationship-speciﬁc investment
in order to specialize production to the buyer’s needs. However, the level
of investment cannot be speciﬁed in the contract between the supplier and
the buyer. The assumption of incomplete contracting leads to a situation in
which the provision of both inputs is below the level which would be attained
if contracts were complete, because the threat of contractual breach reduces
each party’s incentive to invest (hold-up problem). An eﬃcient solution
would generally imply that the party which contributes the most to the value
of the relationship through its investment should own the residual rights of
control. Integration arises when production is very intensive in the input
provided by the ﬁnal-good producer. By contrast, when the contribution of
the other input is very signiﬁcant, outsourcing its production will be optimal.
On this basis, it is possible to make predictions about the way the
relative prevalence of organizational forms varies according to industry
characteristics. Antr` as (2003) assumes that production employs capital and
labour and that ﬁnal-good producers can contribute to capital expenses
8incurred by suppliers. At low levels of capital intensity, it will be optimal
to assign the residual rights of control to the supplier (outsourcing); when
capital intensity is high, the producer will prefer integration. Antr` as and
Helpman (2004) suppose that the production function requires the following
inputs: headquarter services (whose supply is controlled by the ﬁnal-good
producer) and manufactured components. Outsourcing is preferred to
integration in sectors with low intensity of headquarter services, while the
opposite happens in sectors with high headquarter intensity.
Antr` as (2003) presents evidence that the share of intra-ﬁrm U.S. imports
on total U.S. imports is positively related to the capital intensity (and R&D
intensity) of the industry. The share of intra-ﬁrm imports also tends to rise
with the capital-labour ratio of the exporting country. Yeaple (2006) ﬁnds
that intra-ﬁrm U.S. imports from the least developed or emerging countries
are positively correlated with capital intensity, while imports from advanced
countries are positively correlated with R&D intensity. Using data on U.S.
imports at a more disaggregated level, Nunn and Treﬂer (2008) and Bernard
et al. (2008) provide further evidence of the positive relationship between
intra-ﬁrm trade and two measures of headquarter intensity, namely capital
intensity and skill intensity.
Introducing heterogeneous ﬁrms in this setting allows further predictions
about the choice of organizational form to be made. In the work of Melitz
(2003), the assumption that exports require ﬁxed costs determines a selection
mechanism by which exporting is proﬁtable only for the most productive
ﬁrms. A similar line of reasoning leads to the assumption that participation in
9international activities (foreign integration or outsourcing) entails high ﬁxed
costs, and is thus viable only for the most productive ﬁrms. Starting from
this assumption, and also supposing that ﬁxed integration costs are higher
than outsourcing costs, Antr` as and Helpman (2004) show that productivity
ranking inﬂuences the ﬁrm’s choice; speciﬁcally, in sectors with high
headquarter intensity, foreign integration is chosen by the most productive
ﬁrms, while ﬁrms with medium-high productivity prefer foreign outsourcing,
those with medium-low productivity prefer domestic integration, and the
least productive ﬁrms prefer domestic outsourcing. In sectors with low
headquarter intensity, where producing abroad yields a lower advantage, only
two organizational forms remain: foreign outsourcing (for less productive
ﬁrms) and foreign integration (for more productive ﬁrms).
However, these ﬁndings depend crucially on speciﬁc assumptions about
ﬁxed costs. For instance, Antr` as and Helpman (2004) show that if the
ordering of organizational ﬁxed costs were inverted and outsourcing became
more costly than integration, then the most productive ﬁrms would choose
to outsource abroad, while less productive ﬁrms would opt for foreign
integration; lower-productivity ﬁrms would outsource at home and the least
productive ﬁrms would elect domestic integration (Table 1). In the case of
economies of scope in management, assuming lower ﬁxed costs of integration
is more appropriate, because joint supervision of input production and other
activities is advantageous; conversely, when there are signiﬁcant costs related
to managerial overload the assumption of lower ﬁxed costs of outsourcing
seems more correct.
In a diﬀerent setting, the relationship between organizational form and
10ﬁrm productivity is even more complex. Grossman and Helpman (2004)
propose a “managerial incentives” model of international organization of
production. The production of a diﬀerentiated good by a principal requires
a component or a service which can only be provided by a skilled agent.
The agent may act as an independent supplier or as a “division” of the
principal. There is a trade-oﬀ between the stronger incentives (in the case
of an independent supplier) and the greater monitoring allowed by vertical
integration. The authors ﬁnd that foreign outsourcing is chosen by the most
productive and the least productive ﬁrms, while intermediate-productivity
ﬁrms choose to integrate (see Table 1). The intuition is that at the two ends
of the productivity spectrum there is a greater need to induce a high level of
eﬀort in the agent, whose incentives will be stronger if he acts independently;
in the middle range the ability to monitor the agent’s eﬀorts counts more in
raising potential revenues.
Given the extent to which the various assumptions and models inﬂuence
the predictions, empirical evidence is essential in order to discriminate
between them. Using industry-level data, Yeaple (2006) and Bernard et
al. (2008) show that intra-ﬁrm trade is higher in industries with greater
productivity dispersion. Nunn and Treﬂer (2008) conﬁrm this ﬁnding, adding
that the positive relationship between intra-ﬁrm trade and productivity is
stronger for high values of headquarter intensity, as predicted by Antr` as
and Helpman (2004). Among ﬁrm-level studies, Tomiura (2005), analyzing
a wide database on Japanese manufacturing ﬁrms, highlights a signiﬁcant
heterogeneity: fewer than 3% of ﬁrms are involved in foreign outsourcing.
He ﬁnds a positive correlation between the ratio of foreign outsourcing
11to sales, on the one hand, and productivity or size on the other. In a
follow-up paper, Tomiura (2007) extends the analysis to the choice between
international outsourcing and FDI. The results show that organizational
forms follow a productivity ordering which is consistent with the predictions
of Antr` as and Helpman (2004): the most productive ﬁrms engage in FDI,
less productive ﬁrms choose international outsourcing and domestic ﬁrms
are the least productive. This productivity ordering holds even when ﬁrm
size, capital intensity and industry are controlled for. A reverse ranking,
where more productive ﬁrms are less likely to source from aﬃliate suppliers,
is found instead by Defever and Toubal (2007). The composition of their
sample (which only includes ﬁrms that are already multinational , i.e. ﬁrms
that control at least 50% of the equity capital of a foreign aﬃliate) may help
explain their ﬁnding.2
3D a t a
3.1 Sample
Our ﬁrm-level data come from the “Survey on Italian Manufacturing Firms”,
conducted every three years by Mediocredito Capitalia (MCC). We use the
7th wave of the survey, carried out in 1998, in which information about
ﬁrms’ sourcing strategies - the core of our analysis - was collected.3 The
2Using ﬁrm-level data for Spain, Kohler and Smolka (2009) show that ﬁrm labour
productivity, capital intensity and skill intensity are positively correlated with the
probability of sourcing intermediate inputs from an integrated supplier.
3Unfortunately, the subsequent waves of MCC surveys did not include questions on
ﬁrms’ sourcing strategies. Such information was also generally missing in other ﬁrm-level
databases. The results reported in this paper therefore cannot be taken as evidence on
12survey covers the three immediately preceding years (1995-1997), although
some parts of the questionnaire only refer to 1997. Balance sheet data are
available for the years 1989-1997. The sampling design includes all ﬁrms with
a minimum of 500 employees. Firms with between 10 and 499 employees were
selected according to three stratiﬁcation criteria: geographical area, sector
and ﬁrm size. In the 1998 survey the total number of ﬁrms is 4,497. After
dropping the ﬁrms for which balance sheet data or other important variables
were not available, we eventually had 3,976 observations (around 4% of the
universe of Italian manufacturing ﬁrms with 10 or more employees according
to the 2001 census data). The coverage ratio, however, rises to 12.4% for ﬁrms
with 50 or more employees and 24.8% for those with 200 or more employees.
Table 2 shows that the sample is distributed in the various geographical
areas and sectors consistently with the distribution of the reference
population. Firms located in the North-West and ﬁrms operating in the
“chemicals, rubber and plastic” sector are slightly over-represented in the
sample; ﬁrms located in the South and Islands and ﬁrms operating in
the “textiles, clothing and footwear” sector are slightly under-represented.
In terms of ﬁrm size, the sample is somewhat unbalanced in favour of
medium-sized and large ﬁrms.
3.2 Subcontracting
The MCC database provides information on the incidence of subcontracting
in relation to total purchases of goods and services, as well as on the type
of supplier. In the Italian legal system, subcontracting is referred to as “a
the most recent trends of the Italian economy.
13contract by which a ﬁrm engages to carry out processing of semiﬁnished
products or raw materials on behalf of the buying company, or to supply
products or services to be incorporated or used in the buying company’s
economic activity or in the production of a complex good, in conformity
with the buying company’s projects, techniques, technologies, models or pro-
totypes” (Law 192/1998, emphasis added). Our deﬁnition of subcontracting
therefore excludes the purchase of standardized goods or raw materials, in
line with the notion used in the theoretical literature.
The theoretical models indeed assume that the supplier must undertake
relationship-speciﬁc investments in order to produce the goods needed by the
ﬁrm. A quotation from Grossman and Helpman (2005, p. 136) illustrates
the point: “To us, outsourcing means more than just the purchase of raw
materials and standardized goods. It means ﬁnding a partner with which a
ﬁrm can establish a bilateral relationship and having the partner undertake
relationship-speciﬁc investments so that it becomes able to produce goods or
services that ﬁt the ﬁrm’s particular needs”. In fact, with the exception of
Tomiura (2005, 2007), empirical literature has been forced by data limitations
to use a wider deﬁnition of outsourcing, ranging from imports of all -
intermediate and ﬁnal - goods (Antr` as 2003, Yeaple 2006, Nunn and Treﬂer
2008) to raw materials and components (Kurz 2006) or processing exports
(Feenstra and Spencer 2005).
Using our ﬁrm-level data we are able to identify four types of suppliers
(and, correspondingly, four organizational forms, indicated in brackets):
aﬃliates located in Italy (domestic integration); aﬃliates located abroad
(foreign integration); non-aﬃliates located in Italy (domestic outsourcing);
14non-aﬃliates located abroad (foreign outsourcing). These organizational
forms match very closely those usually accounted for in the literature,
allowing for a rigorous test of theoretical predictions. Actually, a ﬁfth
organizational form emerges from our data, namely when the incidence of
subcontracting is zero. Although this could be interpreted as a form of
domestic integration in which all transactions occur within the same ﬁrm,
we think it preferable to consider it as a speciﬁc organizational form (no
sourcing). There are two reasons for this: ﬁrst, the number of no-sourcing
ﬁrms is quite high (about two thirds of all ﬁrms); second, no-sourcing
ﬁrms are markedly diﬀerent from domestic-integration ﬁrms in terms of
industry-level and ﬁrm-level characteristics.
Table 3 shows that about 1.2% of ﬁrms in the sample purchased at least
some inputs from foreign aﬃliates, while 6.8% of ﬁrms purchased at least
some inputs from foreign non-aﬃliates. By comparison, Tomiura (2007)
ﬁnds that the number of foreign-outsourcing ﬁrms was equal to 2.7%. The
diﬀerence is likely due to our sample’s bias in favour of medium-sized and
large ﬁrms. The use of foreign inputs varies considerably across industries.
Foreign integration is more widespread in the “chemicals, rubber and plastic”
industry and in the “metals and mechanical” industry; the latter also ranks
high for foreign and domestic outsourcing, followed by the “textiles, clothing,
footwear” sector. In terms of ﬁrm size, there seems to be a positive monotonic
relationship, except for domestic outsourcing, which reaches its peak in ﬁrms
with 200-499 employees.
Recourse to mixed sourcing strategies (for instance, buying inputs
simultaneously from aﬃliates and non-aﬃliates, or from domestic and foreign
15suppliers) is not infrequent. In particular, there is a strong correlation at the
industry level between domestic outsourcing and foreign outsourcing: sectors
with a high share of domestic outsourcing also tend to have a high share of
foreign outsourcing. Grossman et al. (2005) maintain that this is consistent
with those industries where the ﬁxed cost of outsourcing is very low.
3.3 Productivity
We compute several measures of ﬁrm-level productivity. This variable plays
a crucial role in the study of within-industry heterogeneity and the ﬁxed
costs of the various organizational forms. Looking at several measures of
productivity, we are able to check the robustness of our results to alternative
methods and assumptions. We start with the simplest measure: the log of
value added per worker (VA i/Li). We then consider those measures which are
based on the estimation of the production function. TFP i,OLS is computed
as the residuals from an OLS estimation of a standard Cobb-Douglas,
with labour and capital as factors. As an alternative measure, we run
a ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation and get the (constant over time) residuals for
each ﬁrm (TFP i,FE). Our fourth and ﬁnal measure (TFP i,LP)t a c k l e s
the simultaneity bias in OLS estimations of the production function. The
source of simultaneity bias is the correlation between input levels and the
(unobservable) productivity shock. A positive productivity shock leads
the ﬁrm to increase output, thereby increasing input levels. As suggested
by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), we employ an observable proxy variable
(intermediate inputs) that reacts to variations in the productivity level. The
16Appendix provides a more detailed explanation of the methods used. A
description of all variables is given in Table 4.
Table 5 displays the correlation matrix of the four productivity variables,
together with two diﬀerent size indicators (logs of value added and
employment). Size indicators were added since their use as a proxy for
productivity has not been infrequent in the literature (Helpman et al. 2004,
Yeaple 2006). Despite the diﬀerent methods used, productivity estimates
appear quite similar. The correlation across observations of the four measures
goes from a minimum of 0.56 to a maximum of 0.86. Size indicators are less
strongly correlated with productivity measures, in line with the evidence
reported by Head and Ries (2003).
3.4 Headquarter intensity
We supplement ﬁrm-level data with industry-level data on headquarter
intensity, in order to test the predictions of Antr` as (2003) and Antr` as and
Helpman (2004). Clearly, the importance of headquarter services in the
various industries is not easy to measure, so we use a wide set of indicators
instead of relying on a particular one (see the list in the bottom part of Table
4). Generally speaking, the indicators proxy capital, skill or R&D intensity.4
The inclusion of R&D could be rationalized in the Antr` as and Helpman
(2004) model, but it is also consistent with classic information-based theories
of internalization (Ethier 1986), where ﬁrms in possession of some unique
knowledge choose integration to avoid the risk of technology appropriation.
4The literature on transaction costs, asset speciﬁcity and contractual incompleteness
points to other potential determinants of the choice between integration and outsourcing.
Testing the implications of this literature would go beyond the scope of this paper.
17Capital stock data are not available for Italy at a ﬁne level of
disaggregation, so we take ﬁxed capital investment per worker and compute
the average of a four-year period (Kj/Lj). Skill intensity is measured
as the share of non-production employment in total employment (Hj/Lj).
R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of R&D expenditure to value added
(R&Dj). We also compute two further indicators: SCALEj (average workers
per establishment), which is expected to be correlated with capital intensity,
and average wages per worker (Wj/Lj), which should be correlated with skill
intensity if more highly skilled workers receive higher wages.
The source is Istat, Italy’s national statistical institute (Structural
Business Statistics and, for SCALEj only, Census data). All indicators
are at the 4-digit level of NACE classiﬁcation (which corresponds to 224
manufacturing sectors) and are merged with our ﬁrms’ sample on the basis
of each company’s sector of economic activity. At this level of industrial
disaggregation there is, unfortunately, no measure of advertising intensity.
Table 6 reports the correlation matrix among the headquarter intensity
indicators. In line with our expectations, scale is highly correlated with




The aim of the ﬁrst part of our econometric analysis is to determine whether
there are systematic productivity diﬀerences among ﬁrms depending on their
sourcing strategy. We adapt the methodology used for the comparison
between exporters and non-exporters in Bernard and Jensen (1999) and in
many subsequent papers. We run OLS estimates of the following equation:
Yi = β0+β1FIi+β2FOi+β3DIi+β4Areai+β5Industryi+β6Exporti+ i (1)
where Yi is an indicator of productivity for ﬁrm i,a n dFIi, FOi and
DIi are dummies for each sourcing strategy (relative to the group of
domestic-outsourcing ﬁrms, which is the baseline category). The regression
includes a set of 2-digit industry dummies, area dummies and an export
status dummy. An alternative regression also includes ﬁrm size (measured
by the log of employment) as a further control variable. The coeﬃcients
of interest are β1, β2 and β3, which give the average diﬀerence in ﬁrms’
characteristics between ﬁrms with a given sourcing strategy compared with
domestic-outsourcing ﬁrms, conditional on the other regressors. Using such
a methodology allows an easy comparison of our ﬁndings with the huge
literature on exporting and importing premia. Moreover, it allows us easily
to take into account the four sourcing strategies at the same time and carry
out tests of equality among the coeﬃcients on the sourcing dummies.
As in Bernard and Jensen (1999), the regression should not be thought of
19as a structural model, in which productivity is actually caused by explanatory
variables. Rather, it should be interpreted as a way to get conditional means,
i.e. the average productivity premia (or discounts) for ﬁrms following a given
organizational form relative to other ﬁrms and conditional on a set of factors.
A discussion of causality issues is provided in Section 4.3.
As mentioned in the previous section, in our sample ﬁrms typically
follow mixed strategies, for instance buying inputs from domestic and foreign
suppliers at the same time. This behaviour can be easily explained if
we assume that ﬁrms usually need several inputs and choose the optimal
organizational form for each input. Issues concerning the most appropriate
way to deal with mixed strategies arise in our regression framework. We
start by assigning ﬁrms to a given organizational form on the basis of
the following scheme: ﬁrms buying domestic outsourcing inputs but no
domestic-integration or foreign outsourcing/integration inputs (DO, the
baseline category); ﬁrms buying at least some domestic-integration inputs
but no foreign outsourcing/integration inputs (DI); ﬁrms buying at least
some foreign-outsourcing inputs but no foreign-integration inputs (FO);
ﬁrms buying at least some foreign-integration inputs (FI). The advantage
of this classiﬁcation is that it allows a more clear-cut identiﬁcation of each
organizational form, including FI (for which the number of active ﬁrms is
relatively small and the incidence of mixed strategies is high). However, our
results are also robust to an alternative classiﬁcation method, as we will show
later in the next section.
Table 7, which reports the results controlling for area, industry and
export status, shows that all the coeﬃcients on the three dummies (FI, FO
20and DI) are positive and signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Foreign-integration,
foreign-outsourcing and domestic-integration ﬁrms are larger and more
productive than the baseline group of domestic-outsourcing ﬁrms. Size
premia are larger than productivity premia, as would be expected if larger
ﬁrms tended to be more productive. The magnitude of the coeﬃcients is
highest for FI, lowest for FO, and it is at an intermediate level for DI.
It should be noted that these results do not depend on either industry
composition or on ﬁrms’ export status, as these variables are already
controlled for; otherwise, size and productivity diﬀerences would be even
higher. The next three rows show p-values of tests of equality between
couples of coeﬃcients on sourcing dummies. We always reject the hypothesis
that foreign-outsourcing ﬁrms are as productive as foreign-integration ﬁrms
and (with only one exception) the hypothesis that they are as productive
as domestic-integration ﬁrms. In most cases we also reject the hypothesis
that domestic-integration ﬁrms are as productive as foreign-integration ﬁrms.
The goodness of ﬁt of our model shows a wide variability depending on the
measure of size or productivity (see G¨ org et al. 2008 for similar evidence);
for the most structural indicator (TFP ` a la Levinsohn and Petrin 2003), the
R - s q u a r e di sa sh i g ha s. 6 2 . 5
Overall, these results are largely consistent with the productivity ordering
assumed by Antr` as and Helpman (2004), where foreign-integration ﬁrms
are at the top of the productivity distribution and domestic-outsourcing
ﬁrms are at the bottom. In contrast to their assumptions, however, we
5Weighting observations using a post-stratiﬁcation weight (16 strata, deﬁned according
to sector and ﬁrm size) does not aﬀect our ﬁndings.
21ﬁnd that foreign-outsourcing ﬁrms are less, not more, productive than
domestic-integration ﬁrms. These ﬁndings suggest that, for ﬁrms in our
sample, ﬁxed costs of foreign sourcing are higher than ﬁxed costs of domestic
sourcing and ﬁxed costs of integration are higher than ﬁxed costs of
outsourcing. The latter diﬀerence is quantitatively so important in our data
that it overcomes the diﬀerence in ﬁxed costs of foreign sourcing.
In order to interpret this ﬁnding, one should bear in mind that foreign
outsourcing includes inputs purchased from other EU countries: the EU
Single Market Programme, which implies no barriers to intra-EU trade,
might therefore explain the low ﬁxed costs of foreign outsourcing in our
data. It would be interesting to make a distinction between EU outsourcing
and non-EU outsurcing, but, unfortunately, our data do not include such
information. Low ﬁxed costs of outsourcing might also be explained by Italian
manufacturing industry’s specialization in traditional goods and industrial
machinery. Both sectors are typically characterized by a plentiful use of
independent suppliers, and both show the highest percentages of domestic
and foreign outsourcing (as we have seen in Table 3).
4.2 Robustness analysis
This section analyzes the robustness of our ﬁndings. As a ﬁrst step, we control
for several ﬁrm-level indicators of skills and innovation that could have a
positive impact on productivity. Our data allow us to build the following
ﬁve variables: the share of non-production workers (White collars), the ratio
of R&D investments to sales (R&D) and three dummies for investments
22in ICT hardware or software (ICT investments), introduction of new
products (Product innovation) or new processes (Process innovation)o v e r
the previous three years. In Table 8 we include them among the explanatory
variables.6 As expected, the coeﬃcients on these variables are almost always
positive and often statistically signiﬁcant. The goodness of ﬁt also increases
noticeably. After introducing these variables, the coeﬃcients on sourcing
dummies become only slightly smaller, but are still signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero in each speciﬁcation (except for the foreign-outsourcing dummy in
two out of six speciﬁcations).
Table 9 reports the results when ﬁrm size is included among the control
variables, together with three dummy variables, corresponding to being part
of a group as an aﬃliate (Affiliate), being part of a business consortium
(Business Consortium) and being exposed to competition mainly from large
ﬁrms (Large Competitors). The variability of sourcing premia among TFP
is now greatly reduced, but the productivity diﬀerentials remain statistically
signiﬁcant and quantitatively large. Foreign-integration ﬁrms tend to be
18-27% more productive than domestic-outsourcing ﬁrms; the diﬀerential is
11-17% for domestic-integration ﬁrms and 5-8% for foreign-outsourcing ﬁrms,
always relative to domestic-outsourcing ﬁrms. The results on equality tests
are similar to the previous ones, except for the equality between FI and DI,
which is not rejected.
In Table 10 we test the robustness of our results to two alternative
assumptions. First, we include the set of no-sourcing ﬁrms, which now
6Data on skills and innovation were not available for 9.0% of ﬁrms in our sample (119
out 1,316 ﬁrms).
23becomes the baseline category relative to which the productivity premia are
computed. Second, we modify our sourcing dummies in order to allow for
mixed strategies. Each sourcing dummy now equals one if ﬁrms buy at least a
positive amount of inputs according to that sourcing strategy. Two or more
sourcing dummies may then be simultaneously positive for the same ﬁrm.
Controlling for area, industry and export status, the results are conﬁrmed,
as the coeﬃcients on FI, DI and FO are signiﬁcantly positive, with decreasing
magnitude. There is, instead, no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in terms
of size or productivity between domestic-outsourcing ﬁrms and no-sourcing
ﬁrms. P-values on equality tests also provide further support to the previous
ﬁndings.
Our evidence on productivity diﬀerentials is obtained as an average
across all manufacturing sectors. It would be interesting to see whether
diﬀerent sectors exhibit diﬀerent productivity rankings. This would be
the case if the relative importance of forces leading to integration (e.g.
economies of scope in management) and forces leading to outsourcing (e.g.
managerial overload, suppliers’ incentives) varies across industries. We split
the sample into four groups according to the Pavitt classiﬁcation (traditional,
scale-intensive, specialized and science-based sectors, which to some extent
captures diﬀerences in terms of industry structure and technology.7 Using
ﬁner classiﬁcations is unfortunately not feasible, given the size of the sample.
Unreported estimates show that the productivity ranking is similar in the
various groups, while there are diﬀerences in the magnitude of productivity
7For science-based sectors we do not have enough observations, we therefore focus on
the ﬁrst three sectors only.
24diﬀerentials. The coeﬃcient on FI is indeed larger in traditional sectors than
in the other sectors; this would suggest a higher ﬁxed cost of integration
abroad for ﬁrms in these sectors. The productivity premia for FO are only
signiﬁcant for specialized industries (e.g. industrial machinery), which might
suggest higher costs in ﬁnding specialized suppliers in the foreign country. No
substantial diﬀerence across sectors arises in terms of DI. Further evidence,
possibly based on larger samples, is needed, however, in order to draw more
robust conclusions on this issue.
4.3 Endogeneity
Our results show that there are systematic patterns between ﬁrm
productivity and sourcing strategies, but, being based on a cross-section,
do not say anything about the direction of causality. This section discusses
the potential channels of causation and presents further empirical evidence
on the issue.
On one hand, causality may run from ﬁrm productivity to sourcing
strategies, as long as the latter imply diﬀerent ﬁxed costs and ﬁrms
diﬀer in their productivity levels. Firms would then self-select in a given
organizational form, depending on their productivity level. If, for instance,
ﬁxed costs of foreign integration are very high, only the most productive
ﬁrms will be able to bear them and will choose to produce through
foreign integration, while less productive ﬁrms will opt for less expensive
organizational forms. This is analogous to the self-selection hypothesis in
the literature on exporting and productivity.
25On the other hand, causality may run in the opposite direction, from
sourcing strategies to ﬁrm productivity. In particular, foreign sourcing may
lead to increased productivity in various ways. First, there could be a
learning mechanism by which contacts with foreign suppliers allow ﬁrms to
improve their products. Second, operating with foreign suppliers could give
access to higher-quality inputs or to inputs which are simply not available
from domestic suppliers. A third channel is suggested by Glass and Saggi
(2001). In their model, foreign sourcing lowers marginal costs of production
and increases proﬁts, thus providing greater incentives for innovation. This
in turn may lead to higher productivity for ﬁrms with foreign suppliers.
These potential explanations are, however, only partially consistent with our
ﬁndings, in which domestic-integration ﬁrms turn out to be more (not less)
productive than foreign-outsourcing ﬁrms.
There is an other channel by which sourcing strategy may have an impact
on ﬁrm productivity. Firms might choose to outsource the production of
non-core activities, in order to focus on those activities in which they have a
competitive advantage. In this case outsourcing would determine an increase
in productivity. This explanation too is not consistent with our evidence,
which suggests that outsourcing ﬁrms are less productive than integration
ﬁrms.
If causality runs from sourcing strategies to ﬁrm productivity, then
we would expect a productivity ranking that is only partially consistent
with what we actually observe in our data. On this basis the alternative
interpretation, namely the self-selection hypothesis, would seem more likely.
For further insights on the causality issue it is necessary to turn to
26the empirical evidence. Unfortunately, data on sourcing strategies are only
available on a cross-section basis. This prevents us from running the usual
tests of endogeneity based on time-series information on entry to or exit
from a given organizational form. For almost two thirds of ﬁrms in our
sample, however, we have time-series information on productivity. We are
able to compute the growth rate of productivity between 1992 and 1997 and
regress it on the sourcing dummies in 1997. We also regress the productivity
level in 1992 on the sourcing dummies in 1997 (similarly to Baldwin and Gu
2003 for export premia). The idea behind this test is that if ﬁrms diﬀer ex
ante, then we should already see diﬀerences in productivity levels a few years
before sourcing is observed. The learning channel implies instead that ﬁrms,
starting with similar levels of productivity, experience diﬀerent growth rates
of productivity.8
The upper panel of Table 11 shows that ﬁrms with diﬀerent sourcing
strategies in 1997 do not exhibit any diﬀerence in terms of the productivity
growth rate over the previous ﬁve years. If we look instead at the level
of productivity in 1992, sourcing dummies in 1997 become once again
statistically signiﬁcant in most speciﬁcations, showing a productivity ranking
similar to our previous results.9 These ﬁndings do not provide much support
to the learning hypothesis, while they are somewhat more consistent with
the self-selection hypothesis, showing persistent diﬀerences in productivity
levels. This is also in line with the insights arising from the conceptual
discussion. However, much caution is warranted, given the data limitations
8Unfortunately there is no information on productivity after 1997 in our data.
9The results are robust to changes in the period over which the growth rate of
productivity and its lagged level are measured.




In the second part of our empirical analysis, we adapt the model used by
Yeaple (2006) and Nunn and Treﬂer (2008) to our ﬁrm-level data. We
estimate the following equation:
FORINTi = β0 + β1TFPi,LP + β2HQINTj +  i (2)
where TFPi,LP is the TFP level of ﬁrm i, estimated by Levinsohn-Petrin
method, HQINTj is an indicator of headquarter intensity for industry j
and FORINTi is the share of subcontracted inputs purchased from ﬁrm i’s
own foreign aﬃliates in relation to total subcontracted inputs purchased from
abroad. This equation allows us to estimate the predictions of Antr` as (2003)
and Antr` as and Helpman (2004): foreign integration should be preferred to
foreign outsourcing by more productive ﬁrms and in industries with high
headquarter intensity.
Our data also allow us to estimate a similar equation for domestic inputs,
where DOMINTi is the share of subcontracted inputs purchased from ﬁrm
i’s own domestic aﬃliates in relation to total subcontracted inputs purchased
28from domestic ﬁrms.
DOMINTi = β0 + β1TFPi,LP + β2HQINTj +  i (3)
Several econometric concerns need to be addressed in the analysis. First,
measures of headquarter intensity are, to some extent, correlated with each
other. However, including the indicators one by one in separate regressions
is potentially likely to create an omitted variable bias. Therefore, we choose
to include the various indicators in the same regression, even if this implies a
non-negligible risk of collinearity. Second, the inclusion of industry-level
variables within regressions performed on ﬁrm-level data may lead to a
downward bias in the estimated standard errors (Moulton 1990). To address
this issue, we correct the standard errors for clustering, i.e. we allow for
correlation between observations belonging to the same industry. Third, the
dependent variable can only take values between zero and one. This would
suggest the adoption of limited dependent variable models (Greene 1993).
Nevertheless, we prefer to keep our estimation strategy as close as possible
to Nunn and Treﬂer (2008), where OLS is used. The sensitivity of our main
ﬁndings to alternative estimation methods will be discussed in Section 5.2.
Before starting with the econometric analysis, it is interesting to look
at the distribution of the dependent variables FORINTi and DOMINTi
in Tables 12 and 13, respectively. In both cases, there is evidence of a
bimodal distribution, with peaks at the two extreme values (zero and one).
FORINTi is zero (i.e. all foreign inputs are foreign-outsourcing inputs) in
84% of observations and one (i.e. all foreign inputs are foreign-integration
29inputs) in 10% of observations. DOMINTi is zero in 86% of observations
and one in 8% of observations. The second and third columns of Table 12
split the sample according to whether foreign inputs are less than or equal
to 50% of total inputs (low foreign inputs) or more than 50% (high foreign
inputs). It turns out that about 70% of observations fall among the former.
The distribution of FORINTi still looks similar in the two cases. The second
and third columns of Table 13 replicate the same exercise for DOMINTi:
the large majority of observations reﬂects ﬁrms with high domestic inputs.
Tables 14 and 15 report the results of OLS regressions for FORINTi and
DOMINTi, respectively. Column (1) of both tables includes capital, skill
and R&D intensity measures based on industry-level data. In column (2)
headquarter intensity is proxied by scale and wages per worker. Column (3)
replaces industry-level with ﬁrm-level indicators of headquarter intensity.
Starting from Table 14, we see that ﬁrm’s TFP level has a positive
and highly signiﬁcant eﬀect on foreign integration in every speciﬁcation.
Integration also turns out to be positively correlated with some headquarter
intensity indicators, namely scale and ﬁrm-level capital intensity. In addition,
capital intensity in column (1) would also be signiﬁcant if it were included
in the regression without skill intensity.10
The eﬀects of TFP and headquarter intensity are economically signiﬁcant.
We have calculated standardized or “beta” coeﬃcients, as the product of
the estimated coeﬃcient and the standard deviation of a given explanatory
variable, divided by the standard deviation of the dependent variable. A
10Overall, the explanatory power of the model is not great, with R-squared around .10,
although comparable in magnitude with values reported by Nunn and Treﬂer (2008).
30one-standard-deviation increase in TFP results in a .26 to .29 standard
deviation increase in the share of foreign integration. Beta coeﬃcients
are smaller, but not negligible, for the headquarter intensity indicators
(.11-.16 for the two statistically signiﬁcant indicators). They are comparable,
although mainly on the low side, to those reported by Nunn and Treﬂer (2008)
(between .17 and .30 for capital intensity and between .10 and .22 for skill
intensity).
The results for domestic integration are reported in Table 15. Here again
TFP is always positive and signiﬁcant, although its magnitude is smaller
than in the case of foreign integration. The beta coeﬃcient implied by the
estimates is now more than halved, around .12. The evidence on headquarter
intensity is even stronger, as all measures of capital intensity are signiﬁcantly
correlated with integration.11 12
5.2 Robustness analysis
Our results are robust to the adoption of alternative TFP or size indicators
and to the inclusion of other explanatory variables, suggested by the relevant
11Regressions with ﬁrm-level covariates do not include sector ﬁxed eﬀects, the aim
being to see to what extent ﬁrm-level covariates proxy for industry-level characteristics.
Unreported regressions including either Pavitt classiﬁcation dummies or 2-digit sector
ﬁxed eﬀects show that the results for capital intensity are mainly unchanged (with the
exception of regressions using foreign integration as dependent variable). Sector ﬁxed
eﬀects generally turn out to be statistically signiﬁcant and to have signs in line with the
overall results (traditional sectors such as textiles, clothing etc. are negatively correlated
with domestic or foreign integration).
12We have also checked the prediction of the Antr` as and Helpman (2004) model,
according to which the impact of productivity on integration is higher for sectors with
a higher headquarter intensity. Unreported estimates show that the interaction between
TFP and various headquarter-intensity variables is indeed positive, as expected, but is not
signiﬁcant in most speciﬁcations. This may be due to collinearity among the regressors or
to sample size.
31literature (for instance, Holl 2008): ﬁrm’s wage costs; ﬁrm age; demand
cyclicality and seasonality (Abraham and Taylor 1996); value added over
total industry sales, which proxies for the importance of suppliers’ production
in the overall value chain (Yeaple 2006); area dummies. Unreported estimates
show that these variables are generally not signiﬁcant, with the exception
of age (older ﬁrms are more likely to choose outsourcing, as in Ono 2003)
and area dummies, in some speciﬁcations. Our results are in any case
qualitatively unchanged. We have also included the log level of total
expenditure in intermediate inputs or of expenditure in subcontracting inputs
in order to control for diﬀerences in the amount of input sourcing. There is
some evidence that integration is more likely for higher input purchases, but
the results for the other variables do not substantially change.13
We also use alternative industry-level indicators of headquarter intensity,
drawn from the NBER productivity database (Bartelsman and Gray 1996).
After using the correspondence tables from U.S. SIC 1987 to ISIC rev.3
and from ISIC rev.3 to NACE rev.1, we build the two following U.S.-based
indicators, as in Nunn and Treﬂer (2008): capital per worker and the
ratio of non-production workers. They turn out to be quite correlated
with analogous measures based on Italy’s industry-level data (.57 and .79,
respectively). Unreported estimates show that capital intensity has a positive
and signiﬁcant impact on domestic integration, while no signiﬁcant estimate
is obtained for skill intensity.
Our results are robust to alternative estimation methods. First, we
13Weighting observations using a post-stratiﬁcation weight (16 strata, deﬁned according
to sector and ﬁrm size) does not aﬀect our ﬁndings.
32correct for the potential bias coming from applying OLS to a limited
dependent variable setting, opting for a tobit model instead (Tables 16 and
17, columns 1-3). Second, we transform our dependent variable into a discrete
variable and apply probit model (Tables 16 and 17, columns 4-6). Third, for
the subset of ﬁrms using domestic and foreign inputs at the same time, we
estimate a SURE which takes account of correlated error terms (Table 18).
The results for our variables of interest are only slightly aﬀected.
Finally, we check whether our results are aﬀected by a sample selection
bias, related to the exclusion of no-sourcing ﬁrms (see Tomiura 2005). We
estimate a Heckman probit model of foreign integration. The variable
included in the selection equation but not in the outcome equation is the
export dummy, as a proxy of ﬁrm’s experience in foreign business. The idea
is that export activity might help explain foreign sourcing but should not
be related to whether foreign sourcing takes place through integration or
outsourcing. Clearly, we estimate the model only for foreign integration,
since the selection variable would not work as well for domestic integration.
Table 19 reports the results for the selection and outcome equations. In the
selection equation, the export dummy does a very good job in explaining
the probability of foreign sourcing. In the outcome equation, TFP is still
positive and signiﬁcant for all speciﬁcations, and capital intensity is positive
and signiﬁcant in the last speciﬁcation. It is also important to notice that
LR tests never reject the null hypothesis that equations are independent.
This suggests that there is no sample selection bias in foreign integration
estimates.
336 Concluding remarks
Using data on a sample of Italian manufacturing companies, this paper
provides evidence on the choice between outsourcing and integration at home
and abroad. The main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows.
First, we ﬁnd evidence of statistically signiﬁcant productivity diﬀerentials
among ﬁrms with diﬀerent sourcing strategies, controlling for industry, area
and export status as well as for other variables. Speciﬁcally, there seems
to be a productivity ordering by which foreign-integration ﬁrms are the
most productive, and domestic-outsourcing ﬁrms are the least productive,
as assumed by Antr` as and Helpman (2004). However, in contrast to their
assumptions, we also ﬁnd that foreign-outsourcing ﬁrms are less productive
than domestic-integration ﬁrms. This suggests a relatively high ﬁxed cost of
integration, which more than oﬀsets the ﬁxed cost of operating with foreign
suppliers.
The second result of the paper is that integration is preferred to
outsourcing in headquarter-intensive industries, notably in capital-intensive
industries. This ﬁnding is consistent with previous empirical evidence and
with theoretical predictions by Antr` as (2003) and Antr` as and Helpman
(2004), according to which an eﬃcient solution to the hold-up problem, in a
context of incomplete contracting and relationship-speciﬁc investments, is to
give control rights to the party that contributes the most to the value of the
relationship.
Two main caveats apply. First, we are not able to draw strong conclusions
on whether productivity diﬀerentials reﬂect ex-ante selection or ex-post
34learning, although it is fair to say that this issue is common to much of the
empirical literature on ﬁrm heterogeneity. Second, our ﬁndings should not
be taken as evidence that one organizational form is optimal while another
organizational form is less preferable.
We believe nonetheless that our results provide valuable insights for the
understanding of aggregate phenomena. First of all, they imply that Italian
manufacturing industry will show a greater preference for outsourcing over
FDI than other EU countries’ industries, given its smaller average ﬁrm size
and its specialization in sectors with a lower capital intensity.
Furthermore, our ﬁndings suggest that models based on incomplete
contracting and relationship-speciﬁc investments are indeed very relevant to
ﬁrms’ global sourcing strategies. Theory has only just begun to investigate
their policy implications (Antr` as and Staiger 2008, Ornelas and Turner 2008).
One of the main results is that if contracts are incomplete in the foreign
country (as might be expected in the case of developing countries with weak
property rights and institutions), the hold-up problem leads to an ineﬃciently
low volume of input trade, and this creates a new and stronger rationale
for trade policy intervention. A more general point is that if the hold-up
problem is quite pervasive, “international trade agreements should extend
their focus beyond the traditional market access concerns of establishing
and maintaining conditions of competition to cover as well the conditions of
bargaining” (Antr` as and Staiger 2008, p. 2).
Finally, as argued by Antr` as and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), ﬁrms’
organizational decisions often interact with technology or institutional
factors, such as the quality of the legal environment, which lead to diﬀerent
35economic outcomes. Although less investigated, their dynamic implications
may also be potentially signiﬁcant in terms of the evolution of economic
activity, skills and knowledge.
36Appendix
Four productivity measures are computed and used throughout the study.
The output proxy is always value added. Sales are inﬂuenced by diﬀerences in
intermediate input usage: a ﬁrm with the same “true” productivity of another
ﬁrm and larger purchases of intermediate inputs would wrongly appear as
more productive using sales-based indicators (Kurz 2006).
VA i/Li: log of value added (gross output net of intermediate inputs),
divided by the number of workers.
TFP i,OLS: residuals from OLS estimate of the following production
function:
yi,t = α + βli,t + γki,t + ηi,t (4)
where yi,t is the log of value added, li,t is the log of the number of workers,
ki,t is the log of the capital stock (tangible and intangible assets, excluding
ﬁnancial assets) and ηi,t is the error term.
TFP i,FE: ﬁxed-error component from ﬁxed-eﬀects estimate of equation
4.
TFP i,LP: productivity component from GMM estimation of the following
production function, using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method:
yi,t = α + βli,t + γki,t + θmi,t + ωi,t + ηi,t (5)
where yi,t, li,t and ki,t are deﬁned as above, mi,t is the log of intermediate
goods and materials, ωi,t is the transmitted productivity component and ηi,t
37is an error term uncorrelated with input choices.
OLS, FE and GMM estimates are run on a panel of 3,976 ﬁrms between
1989 and 1997, separately for each (NACE classiﬁcation) 2-digit industry
(four industries with a small number of ﬁrms are grouped to proximate
industries (16 to 15, 23 to 24, 30 to 29, 37 to 36)). Value added, capital stock
and intermediate goods and services are deﬂated using 2-digit industry-level
deﬂators provided by the National Statistical Institute (Istat).
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44Table 1: Productivity ranking in various models
AH(04) AH(04) GH(04)
fi>fo fi<fo
Foreign integration 1 2 3
Foreign outsourcing 2 1 1 or 4
Domestic integration 3 4 2
Domestic outsourcing 4 3
Source: adapted from Spencer (2005). The table reports the productivity ranking for
ﬁrms following alternative strategies according to various models. AH(04): Antr` as and
Helpman (2004). GH(04): Grossman and Helpman (2004). fi: ﬁxed cost of integration.
fo: ﬁxed cost of outsourcing.
45Table 2: Sample composition
Sample Population
No. ﬁrms % No. ﬁrms %
Geographical area
North West 1,615 40.6 34,246 36.0
North East 1,183 29.8 29,032 30.6
Centre 685 17.2 17,799 18.7
South and Islands 493 12.4 13,940 14.7
Sector
Textiles, clothing, footwear 654 16.5 20,123 21.2
Chemicals, rubber, plastic 459 11.5 7,144 7.5
Metals and mechanical ind. 1,658 41.7 39,852 41.9
Other manufacturing ind. 1,205 30.3 27,898 29.4
Employment level
10-49 2,443 61.4 82,628 87.0
50-199 1,023 25.7 10,335 10.9
200-499 330 8.3 1,475 1.6
+500 180 4.5 579 0.6
Total manufacturing 3,976 100.0 95,017 100.0
Source: Author’s calculations on MCC and Istat data. Population data refer to 2001.
46Table 3: Sourcing strategies by industry and ﬁrm size
FI FO DI DO NO
Sector
Textiles, clothing, footwear 0.9 7.0 5.5 28.6 66.8
Chemicals, rubber, plastic 1.5 5.9 4.4 23.8 72.3
Metals and mechanical ind. 1.6 8.9 5.7 38.1 58.1
Other manufacturing ind. 0.6 4.1 2.3 21.2 76.9
Employment level
10-49 0.2 5.2 1.9 28.7 69.6
50-199 1.3 6.9 6.3 29.5 65.6
200-499 4.9 13.6 11.5 37.0 55.2
+500 7.2 14.4 16.7 32.2 60.0
Total 1.2 6.8 4.5 29.8 66.9
Source: Author’s calculations on MCC data. The table reports the percentage shares of
ﬁrms in the total number of ﬁrms, by sector and employment level, separately for the
various forms of sourcing strategies. FI: foreign integration. FO: foreign outsourcing. DI:
domestic integration. DO: domestic outsourcing. NO: no sourcing. The sourcing strategies
reported in this table are not mutually exclusive.
47Table 4: List of variables
Variable Description Period Source
Firm-level variables
DOMINTi Inputs from domestic aﬃliates over domestic inputs 1996 MCC
FORINTi Inputs from foreign aﬃliates over foreign inputs 1996 MCC
VA i Log value added 1996 MCC
Li Log employment 1996 MCC
VA i/Li Log value added over employment 1996 MCC
TFP i,OLS Log TFP estimated by OLS 1996 MCC
TFP i,FE Log TFP estimated by ﬁxed eﬀects 1996 MCC
TFP i,LP Log TFP estimated by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method 1996 MCC
Ki/Li Log capital stock over employment 1996 MCC
Hi/Li Non-production employment over total employment 1996 MCC
R&Di R&D expenditure over sales 1996 MCC
Industry-level variables
Kj/Lj Log average investment over employment 1998-2001 Istat
Hj/Lj Share of non-production employment 1998 Istat
R&Dj R&D expenditure over value added 1997 Istat
SCALEj Log workers per establishment 2001 Istat
Wj/Lj Log wages per worker 1998 Istat
48Table 5: Correlation matrix among productivity and size indicators
VA i/Li TFPi,OLS TFPi,FE TFPi,LP VA i Li
VA i/Li 1
TFPi,OLS .862 1
TFPi,FE .657 .715 1
TFPi,LP .649 .569 .558 1
VA i .449 .347 .590 .587 1
Li .094 .030 .384 .395 .931 1
Source: Author’s calculations on MCC data. The table reports correlation coeﬃcients
among productivity and size indicators.
Table 6: Correlation matrix among headquarter intensity indicators
Kj/Lj Hj/Lj R&Dj SCALEj Wj/Lj
Kj/Lj 1
Hj/Lj .133 1
R&Dj .228 .444 1
SCALEj .477 .166 .270 1
Wj/Lj .444 .809 .357 .550 1
Source: Author’s calculations on Istat data. The table reports correlation coeﬃcients
among indicators of headquarter intensity.
49Table 7: Productivity premia
VA i Li VA i/Li TFPi,OLS TFPi,FE TFPi,LP
Premia
FI 2.02 1.73 .29 .17 .42 .76
FO .39 .31 .08 .06 .10 .12
DI .99 .81 .18 .11 .22 .38
Export .61 .55 (.06) (.02) .11 .20
Equality tests (p-values)
FI = FO .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
FI = DI .00 .00 .21 .49 .04 .00
FO= DI .00 .00 .08 .24 .02 .00
Obs. 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316
R-sq. .23 .21 .12 .03 .08 .62
Source: Author’s calculations on MCC data. The table reports coeﬃcients on sourcing
dummies and p-values for equality tests between coeﬃcients. All coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant
at the 10% level, unless in brackets. The coeﬃcients are obtained from the following OLS
regression:
Yi = β0 + β1FIi + β2FOi + β3DIi + β4Areai + β5Industryi + β6Exporti +  i
where Yi is a given characteristic of ﬁrm i, FIi, FOi and DIi are dummies corresponding
to the sourcing strategies (relatively to domestic-outsourcing ﬁrms). The regression
includes 2-digit industry dummies, area dummies (unreported coeﬃcients) and a dummy
for the export status. FIi: one if ﬁrm i buys at least some foreign-integration inputs,
zero otherwise. FOi: one if ﬁrm i buys at least some foreign-outsourcing inputs but
no foreign-integration input, zero otherwise. DIi: one if ﬁrm i buys at least some
domestic-integration inputs but no foreign-outsourcing/integration input, zero otherwise.
50Table 8: Productivity premia (controlling for indicators of skills and
innovation)
VA i Li VA i/Li TFPi,OLS TFPi,FE TFPi,LP
Premia
FI 1.84 1.60 .24 .14 .38 .69
FO .32 .28 (.05) (.02) .07 .09
DI .89 .74 .15 .09 .19 .34
Export .51 .48 (.03) (.02) .10 .16
White collars (-.36) -1.03 .66 .56 .40 .35
R&D .09 .10 (.00) (-.01) (.01) (.01)
ICT investments .34 .33 (.01) (.01) .06 .11
Product innovation .32 .31 (.01) (-.02) (.02) .08
Process innovation .18 .15 (.03) (.00) (.02) (.04)
Equality tests (p-values)
FI = FO .00 .00 .00 .06 .00 .00
FI = DI .00 .00 .21 .53 .04 .00
FO= DI .00 .00 .05 .15 .02 .00
Obs. 1,197 1,197 1,197 1,197 1,197 1,197
R-sq. .28 .29 .18 .09 .13 .63
Source: Author’s calculations on MCC data. The table reports coeﬃcients on sourcing
dummies and p-values for equality tests between coeﬃcients. All coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant
at the 10% level, unless in brackets. The coeﬃcients are obtained from the following OLS
regression:
Yi = β0 + β1FIi + β2FOi + β3DIi + β4Areai + β5Industryi + β6Exporti +

βzZi +  i
where Yi is a given characteristic of ﬁrm i, FIi, FOi and DIi are dummies corresponding
to the sourcing strategies (compared with domestic-outsourcing ﬁrms). Zi includes ﬁve
ﬁrm-level indicators of skills and innovation. The regression includes 2-digit industry
dummies, area dummies (unreported coeﬃcients) and a dummy for the export status.
Sourcing dummies are deﬁned as in Table 7.
51Table 9: Productivity premia (controlling for ﬁrm size and other
variables)
VA i/Li TFPi,OLS TFPi,FE TFPi,LP
Premia
FI .25 .17 .19 .26
FO .07 .06 .06 (.03)
DI .17 .12 .13 .14
Export (.04) (.03) (.03) (.04)
Size (.00) (-.02) .13 .28
Large Competitors .10 .05 (.03) .06
Business Consortium (.00) (-.01) (.01) (-.01)
Affiliate (.03) (.02) (-.04) (.03)
Equality tests (p-values)
FI = FO .01 .08 .10 .00
FI = DI .32 .46 .49 .14
FO= DI .08 .22 .14 .04
Obs. 1,315 1,315 1,315 1,315
R-sq. .13 .04 .18 .74
Source: Author’s calculations on MCC data. The table reports coeﬃcients on sourcing
dummies and p-values for equality tests between coeﬃcients. All coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant
at the 10% level, unless in brackets. The coeﬃcients in the upper part of the table are




where Yi is a given characteristic of ﬁrm i, FIi, FOi and DIi are dummies corresponding
to the sourcing strategies (compared with domestic-outsourcing ﬁrms). The regression
includes 2-digit industry dummies, area dummies (unreported coeﬃcients), a dummy for
the export status and the log of employment. Sourcing dummies are deﬁned as in Table
7.
52Table 10: Productivity premia (relatively to no-sourcing ﬁrms)
VA i Li VA i/Li TFPi,OLS TFPi,FE TFPi,LP
Premia
FI 1.26 1.12 .14 (.08) .25 .49
FO .30 .26 (.04) (.02) .06 .08
DI .85 .72 .13 .08 .17 .29
DO (-.04) (-.02) (-.02) (-.01) (-.02) (-.02)
Equality tests (p-values)
FI = FO .00 .00 .23 .48 .05 .00
FI = DI .11 .09 .93 .99 .45 .09
FI = DO .00 .00 .03 .23 .00 .00
FO= DI .00 .00 .12 .25 .04 .00
FO= DO .00 .00 .13 .43 .06 .04
DI = DO .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Obs. 3,976 3,976 3,976 3,976 3,976 3,976
R-sq. .16 .15 .12 .05 .08 .61
Source: Author’s calculations on MCC data. The table reports coeﬃcients on sourcing
dummies and p-values for equality tests between coeﬃcients. All coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant
at the 10% level, unless in brackets. The coeﬃcients are obtained from the following OLS
regression:
Yi = β0 + β1FIi + β2FOi + β3DIi + β4DOi + β5Areai + β6Industryi + β7Exporti +  i
where Yi is a given characteristic of ﬁrm i, FIi, FOi, DIi and DOi are dummies
corresponding to the sourcing strategies (compared with no-sourcing ﬁrms). The regression
includes 2-digit industry dummies, area dummies and a dummy for the export status
(unreported coeﬃcients). FIi: one if ﬁrm i buys at least some foreign-integration inputs,
zero otherwise. FOi: one if ﬁrm i buys at least some foreign-outsourcing inputs, zero
otherwise. DIi: one if ﬁrm i buys at least some domestic-integration inputs, zero
otherwise. DOi: one if ﬁrm i buys at least some domestic-outsourcing inputs, zero
otherwise. In contrast with the previous tables, the sourcing dummies in this table are
not mutually exclusive.
53Table 11: Productivity premia (5-year growth rate and lagged level)
VA i Li VA i/Li TFPi,OLS TFPi,FE TFPi,LP
1992-97 growth rate regressed on 1997 sourcing dummies
FI (.02) (-.04) (.06) (.05) - (.05)
FO -.07 (-.02) (-.06) (-.05) - -.08
DI (.03) (-.02) (.07) (.07) - (.04)
Obs. 841 841 841 841 - 742
R-sq. .05 .04 .07 .06 - .07
1992 level regressed on 1997 sourcing dummies
FI 1.76 1.61 .15 (.05) .35 .55
FO .30 (.16) .14 .11 (.06) .17
DI .68 .61 (.07) (.02) .17 .19
Obs. 841 841 841 841 841 742
R-sq. .24 .24 .12 .06 .10 .67
Source: Author’s calculations on MCC data. The table reports coeﬃcients on sourcing
dummies. All coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 10% level, unless in brackets. The
coeﬃcients are obtained from the following OLS regression:
Yi = β0 + β1FIi + β2FOi + β3DIi + β4Areai + β5Industryi + β6Exporti +  i
where Yi is a given characteristic of ﬁrm i, FIi, FOi and DIi are dummies corresponding
to the sourcing strategies (compared with domestic-outsourcing ﬁrms). The dependent
variable is the growth rate of size or productivity between 1992 and 1997, the level of
size or productivity in 1992 in the lower panel. Sourcing dummies refer to 1997. The
regression includes 2-digit industry dummies, area dummies and a dummy for the export
status (unreported coeﬃcients). Sourcing dummies are deﬁned as in Table 7.
54Table 12: Foreign integration: descriptive statistics
Total Low foreign High foreign
inputs inputs
0 84.2 60.1 24.2
.01-.25 1.0 0.7 0.3
.26-.50 2.0 1.7 0.3
.51-.75 1.7 1.7 0.0
.76-.99 1.0 0.3 0.7
1 10.1 6.0 4.0
Total 100.0 70.5 29.5
Source: Author’s calculations on MCC data. The ﬁrst column reports the distribution
of FORINTi (ﬁrm i’s subcontracting inputs from its own foreign aﬃliates over total
subcontracting inputs from foreign companies) for 298 ﬁrms with foreign sourcing. The
second and third columns split the sample according to whether foreign inputs are less
than or equal to 50% of total inputs (low foreign inputs) or are more than 50% (high
foreign inputs), respectively.
Table 13: Domestic integration: descriptive statistics
Total Low domestic High domestic
inputs inputs
0 86.1 3.8 82.2
.01-.25 2.2 0.0 2.2
.26-.50 2.6 0.2 2.4
.51-.75 0.5 0.0 0.5
.76-.99 0.7 0.0 0.7
1 7.9 0.5 7.5
Total 100.0 4.4 95.6
Source: Author’s calculations on MCC data. The ﬁrst column reports the distribution
of DOMINTi (ﬁrm i’s subcontracting inputs from its own domestic aﬃliates over total
subcontracting inputs from domestic companies) for 1,284 ﬁrms with domestic sourcing.
The second and third columns split the sample according to whether domestic inputs are
less than or equal to 50% of total inputs (low domestic inputs) or are more than 50% (high
domestic inputs), respectively.
55Table 14: Determinants of foreign integration
(1) (2) (3)


















R-sq. .089 .108 .095
Obs. 298 298 298
Source: Author’s calculations on MCC and Istat data. The table reports OLS estimates
of the following equation:
FORINTi = β0 + β1TFPi,LP + β2HQINTj +  i
where FORINTi is ﬁrm i’s subcontracting inputs from its own foreign aﬃliates over total
subcontracting inputs from foreign companies, TFPi,LP is the TFP level, estimated by
Levinsohn-Petrin method, and HQINTj is a set of headquarter intensity indicators for
industry j. For the deﬁnition of subcontracting inputs see Section 3.2. Standard errors
(clustered at 4-digit industry level) are in brackets. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at
the 1, 5 and 10 % level.
56Table 15: Determinants of domestic integration
(1) (2) (3)


















R-sq. .019 .024 .035
Obs. 1,284 1,284 1,284
Source: Author’s calculations on MCC and Istat data. The table reports OLS estimates
of the following equation:
DOMINTi = β0 + β1TFPi,LP + β2HQINTj +  i
where DOMINTi is ﬁrm i’s subcontracting inputs from its own domestic aﬃliates over
total subcontracting inputs from foreign companies, TFPi,LP is the TFP level, estimated
by Levinsohn-Petrin method, and HQINTj is a set of headquarter intensity indicators
for industry j. For the deﬁnition of subcontracting inputs see Section 3.2. Standard errors
(clustered at 4-digit industry level) are in brackets. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at
the 1, 5 and 10 % level.
57Table 16: Determinants of foreign integration: tobit and probit
Tobit Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TFPi,LP 1.684*** 1.692*** 1.587*** .510*** .525*** .462***

















Pseudo R-sq. .082 .098 .070 .105 .120 .117
Obs. 298 298 298 298 298 298
Source: Author’s calculations on MCC and Istat data. Columns 1-3 report tobit estimates
of the following equation:
FORINTi = β0 + β1TFPi,LP + β2HQINTj +  i
where FORINTi is ﬁrm i’s subcontracting inputs from its own foreign aﬃliates over total
subcontracting inputs from foreign companies, TFPi,LP is the TFP level, estimated by
Levinsohn-Petrin method, and HQINTj is a set of headquarter intensity indicators for
industry j. For the deﬁnition of subcontracting inputs see Section 3.2. Columns 4-6 report
probit estimates of a similar equation, where the dependent variable is a discrete variable
(one if FORINTi is larger than zero, zero otherwise). Standard errors (clustered at 4-digit
industry level) are in brackets. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 %
level.
58Table 17: Determinants of domestic integration: tobit and probit
Tobit Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TFPi,LP .631*** .681*** .561*** .231*** .243*** .203**

















Pseudo R-sq. .020 .031 .042 .025 .039 .054
Obs. 1,284 1,284 1,284 1,284 1,284 1,284
Source: Author’s calculations on MCC and Istat data. Columns 1-3 report tobit estimates
of the following equation:
DOMINTi = β0 + β1TFPi,LP + β2HQINTj +  i
where DOMINTi is ﬁrm i’s subcontracting inputs from its own domestic aﬃliates over
total subcontracting inputs from domestic companies, TFPi,LP is the TFP level, estimated
by Levinsohn-Petrin method, and HQINTj is a set of headquarter intensity indicators
for industry j. For the deﬁnition of subcontracting inputs see Section 3.2. Columns 4-6
report probit estimates of a similar equation, where the dependent variable is a discrete
variable (one if DOMINTi is larger than zero, zero otherwise). Standard errors (clustered
at 4-digit industry level) are in brackets. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and
10 % level.
59Table 18: Determinants of foreign and domestic integration: SURE
(1) (2) (3)
Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic
TFPi,LP .085*** .050*** .094*** .062*** .110** .052**

















R-sq. .068 .047 .083 .064 .086 .049
Obs. 267 267 267
Source: Author’s calculations on MCC and Istat data. The table reports seemingly
unrelated regression (SURE) estimates of the following system of equations:
FORINTi = β0 + β1TFPi,LP + β2HQINTj +  i
DOMINTi = β3 + β4TFPi,LP + β5HQINTj +  i
where FORINTi is ﬁrm i’s subcontracting inputs from its own foreign aﬃliates over
total subcontracting inputs from foreign companies, DOMINTi is ﬁrm i’s subcontracting
inputs from its own domestic aﬃliates over total subcontracting inputs from domestic
companies, TFPi,LP is the TFP level, estimated by Levinsohn-Petrin method, and
HQINTj is a set of headquarter intensity indicators for industry j. For the deﬁnition of
subcontracting inputs see Section 3.2. Standard errors (clustered at 4-digit industry level)
are in brackets. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 % level.
60Table 19: Determinants of foreign integration: selection model
(1) (2) (3)
Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome
TFPi,LP .159*** .527*** .149*** .525*** .131*** .470***

















Exporti .513*** .530*** .521***
(.086) (.086) (.086)
ρ .297 .038 .315
χ2 .21 .00 .27
Obs. 3,861 3,861 3,861
Censored obs. 3,569 3,569 3,569
Source: Author’s calculations on MCC and Istat data. The table reports a Heckman
probit model with selection. The selection equation estimates the probability of foreign
sourcing and includes the same explanatory variables as the outcome model, together with
an export dummy (excluded variable). The outcome model is:
DUMMYFORINTi = β0 + β1TFPi,LP + β2HQINTj +  i
where DUMMYFORINTi is one if FORINTi is greater than zero, zero otherwise,
TFPi,LP is the TFP level, estimated by Levinsohn-Petrin method, and HQINTj is a set
of headquarter intensity indicators for industry j. The outcome model is deﬁned for all
ﬁrms with non-missing values for FORINTi. For the deﬁnition of subcontracting inputs
see Section 3.2. Standard errors (clustered at 4-digit industry level) are in brackets. ***,
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